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Abstract 
 
Energy transition is a task faced by every country in order to combat climate change, therefore, the choice of 
renewable energy supporting policy is a crucial decision for politicians. In Europe, since Renewable Energy 
Directive was agreed in 2009, various policy schemes have been adopted in many countries, and Swedish Electricity 
Certificate System is one of them. Starting from 2003 until now, it has assisted Sweden to become the country with 
highest percentage of renewable electricity in total electricity generation among all the European member countries, 
and has included Norway from 2012 to create a joint market for electricity certificates between these two counties.  
 
However, the increase of renewable electricity production is only one part of the picture, while the other part is 
involved with concerns on the inequity among renewable electricity producers within the system. During more than 
tens years of operation, the systems has generated a large amount of benefits for a small share of renewable 
electricity producers, who have already been phased out of the system by the end of 2014, after obtaining excess 
percentage of payment by consumers. The technology-neutral nature of the policy scheme needs to be questioned, 
because it not only has created the equity issue in the past, but also indicates the same issue potentially in the future. 
The purpose of this study is to find out to what extent this inequity existed in the past, the impacts on different 
renewable electricity producers, and whether the inequity will continue to happen in the future. These conclusions 
will help us to see if the Swedish Electricity Certificate System is really a sustainable policy, or the one needs to be 
improved. 
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1. Introduction 
Energy consumption largely affects the progress of the international agenda on climate 
change. Energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy has been acknowledged by 
more and more people as one of the imperative measures to reduce carbon emissions. 
Electricity use is undoubtedly the most important part in energy consumption, thus the 
adoption of clean energy in electricity generation has been listed on many countries’ national 
electricity policy agenda, especially in Europe. In 2009, Renewable Energy Directive 
(2009/28/EC) set mandatory targets for all member states to fulfill at least 20% of their total 
energy needs with renewables by 2020 — to be achieved through the attainment of individual 
national targets. All EU countries must also ensure that at least 10% of their transport fuels 
come from renewable sources by 2020. Most of the European countries have made continuous 
efforts in achieving the goal in their national electricity supply. 
Although with similar goals to achieve, different countries have implemented different 
public policies to support the process. This paper has chosen Sweden’s tradable green 
certificates scheme — Electricity Certificate System (ECS) — as the target policy to discuss. 
Sweden has the second highest percentage of ‘share of renewable energy in gross final energy’ 
according to Eurostat.
1
 The research on different renewable energy technologies is also at the 
upfront position in the world. Therefore, the analysis of the Swedish ECS will reflect the 
lessons learned from a relatively successful result, and shed light on policy-making in 
developing countries, thus speed up the worldwide development of renewable energy.  
To evaluate a policy, there are many criteria. The discussion on Swedish ECS in this 
paper will focus on whether the policy has given equivalent incentives to different renewable 
energy producers. Technology-neutral is a major feature of the policy, our research is going to 
find out whether the impacts of the policy is ‘technology-neutral’ as well. Therefore, the 
research question is: will some producers be over-compensated and some under-compensated 
due to the heterogeneity? Equity is our evaluation criterion in the discussion, not only because 
it is an important aspect of policy evaluation, but also due to the diversity of producers in the 
ECS. Equity needs to be guaranteed among different producers, new plants or old plants, new 
technology or old technology, as long as they are renewable energy producers and contribute 
to the whole transition of energy supply. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine if 
                                                          
1 Eurostat’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 
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the Swedish renewable electricity policy has met the equity criterion, and if not, to what 
extent the inequity exists.  
There is not a lot of research specifically on Sweden’s Electricity Certificate System, 
although the discussions on the policy scheme it represents — Tradable Green Certificates 
(TGCs) — are many. TGCs schemes are frequently compared to another popular scheme, 
Feed-in Tariff (FIT). They have different policy measures but aim the same goal, which is to 
stimulate the development of renewable electricity generation. As for TGCs schemes, the 
discussions have various topics, such as market power (Amundsen and Nese 2002), price and 
volume effect (Bye 2003, Amundsen et al. 2006), political uncertainty (Canton and Lindén, 
2010), as well as the uncertainty when integrated with Emission Trading system in Europe 
(Böhringer and Rosendahl 2010; Amundsen and Mortensen 2001; Morthorst 2003). When it 
expands among countries, which is applied in the Swedish and Norwegian case, caution is 
suggested to be taken (Nielsen and Jeppesen 2003; Río 2005; Unger and Ahlgren 2005; Toke 
2008; Amundsen and Nese 2009; Amundsen and Bergman 2012). More importantly, windfall 
profit generated in TGCs is at the centre of controversy. It has been ‘largely viewed as less 
equitable than FITs for those looking to invest in the renewable electricity generating industry’ 
(IRENA, 2014). It may create barriers for the entry of new renewable electricity producers 
and result in the increased market power for larger players (Batlle et al. 2012). High and 
persistent excessive profits are in place for mature technologies (Verbruggen and Lauber 
2012).  
In this paper, we are going to refer to Bergek and Jacobsson’s research in 2010, which  is 
in response to the three policy expectations of Swedish Electricity Certificate System. By 
analysing the data from 2003 to 2008, they came to the conclusion that the Swedish TGCs has 
almost met the expectation for increase in renewable electricity production, but it performs 
badly in terms of consumer costs, equity, and contribution to technical change and cost 
reduction. In this paper, we will develop our research based on Bergek and Jacobsson’s 
method, but extend it as well, in order to achieve more detailed and specific conclusions. 
Based on the data from the accounting system for Swedish ECS from 2003 to 2013, producer 
surplus is calculated in the form of two types of rents gained by renewable electricity 
producers. The first type is up-to-now rent, generated from overcompensation for plants that 
have been phased out of the system by the end of 2014; the second type is future rent 
projection, under the circumstance that more expensive technology for renewable electricity 
generation (such as Off-shore wind power) is introduced into the system. In our analysis, the 
rents are expected to be shown in numerical terms or possible future trend (due to limited data 
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access), so that the conclusions of whether the equity issue does exist and whether it will 
continue could be made. We are also interested to see the allocation of the inequity among 
different renewable energy sources. 
This study is based on previous studies so the methodology used is not new. Some 
assumptions were made in order to proceed the discussion, which may not be the same in 
reality. Due to the data accessibility, some values chosen are not accurate enough. The 
research is not completely finished yet, given the uncertainty of the policy. However, the 
discussion is open so further research is easy to carry out based on the conclusions so far. 
In this paper, the arrangement for chapters are as follows: chapter 2 starts with the 
concept of Tradable Green Certificates and the key agents in the Swedish scheme, and is 
continued with some important policy tools and indicators that formulate the system. Chapter 
3 briefly introduces the criteria in renewable energy policy evaluation and identifies the one 
used in this paper, the equity criterion. Chapter 4 and 5 are the main body of this paper with 
theoretical foundation of the analysis and the empirical results. The results of the analysis will 
lead to the conclusions in Chapter 6. 
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2. Tradable Green Certificates 
2.1 What is a TGCs scheme? 
Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs) is a policy scheme deployed by a few European 
countries so far for the development of renewable energy, based on their national goals in 
order to achieve the 2020 target of EU. Countries that have adopted TGCs include the 
Netherlands, Belgium, UK, Sweden, etc. An alternative policy scheme for that is Feed-in 
Tariff (FIT), which is also widely used as a renewable energy policy in Europe. Germany and 
Spain are among the others the ones that have adopted FIT for a longer time.  
The TGCs system is basically designed to increase the electricity production from 
renewable sources. To achieve this, usually the electricity consumers are required to include a 
certain percentage of renewable electricity in their overall electricity consumption. This 
percentage requirement is set by the government, different and on a increasing trend year after 
year. This part of energy consumption needs to be realised by purchasing electricity 
certificates from renewable electricity producers. The certificate-entitled producers get the 
certificates from government agency based on their production units, e.g. one unit of 
electricity production gets one certificate. Therefore, the price of certificates is generated by 
demand and supply on the market: demand from electricity consumers and supply from 
renewable electricity producers. In this way, renewable electricity producers can get an extra 
price from the certificate other than the electricity price, which formulates a subsidy for their 
higher marginal cost. TGCs may have different design characteristics and specific targets in 
each country, however, it is considered to be a market-oriented subsidy aiming at stimulating 
electricity generation from renewable sources in a cost-efficient manner. The market-driven 
nature also guarantees that it is technology-neutral. 
However, TGCs has been questioned ever since this scheme was introduced. The 
perspectives are various. In regard to a national TGCs scheme, it might not perform as 
efficiently as expected in reality due to the existence of market power (Amundsen and Nese 
2002), price and volume effect when raising quota (Bye 2003, Amundsen et al. 2006), or 
political uncertainty (Canton and Lindén, 2010). When integrated with electricity market, the 
effectiveness and the possible contributions to national GHG-reduction strategies might not 
hold (Morthorst 2003). The overlapping of TGCs and EU ETS and its influence on both 
goals—the renewable energy goal and the CO2 emission goal—are also hot topics 
(Amundsen and Mortensen 2001, Böhringer and Rosendahl 2010). In this paper, we will 
focus on national TGCs scheme itself. 
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2.2 Tradable Green Certificates in Sweden 
2.2.1 Swedish Electricity Certificate System (Elcertifikatsystemet) 
Sweden is one of the earliest European countries in introducing TGCs. In May 2003, the 
Swedish Electricity Certificate System (Elcertifikatsystmet in Swedish) was established by 
Swedish Energy Agency (SEA), a government agency for national energy policy issues. An 
initial goal was to increase 10 TWh ‘green’ power by 2010 relative to that of 2002, in 
response to the EU’s RES-E Directive. This goal was subsequently increased during several 
policy changes until in 2009, which was raised to 25 TWh increase by 2020. Since Jan 2012, 
a common certificate market with Norway was established, whose goal is to increase 
renewable electricity production by a total of 26.4 TWh—13.2 TWh each country—between 
2012 and 2020. The common electricity certificate market is due to continue until the end of 
2035. Recently, the ambition of a 30 TWh increase of renewable electricity under the 
certificate system by 2020 is proposed by SEA and that will again lead to a policy adjustment 
in Sweden. 
According to Eurostat, the share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption 
in Sweden is 51% in 2012, exceeding the target of 49% set by European Union. The 
percentage of electricity generated from renewable sources is 60% in 2012, which is also at a 
leading position among all European countries. After more than ten years of operation, the 
number of plants, installed capacity, and electricity production from renewable electricity 
producers in Elcertifikatsystemet have all made obvious progress. Figure 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are 
the illustrations of these three main indicators.  
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Figure 2.1  Number of certificate-entitled plants in ECS in 2003 and 2012 
Source: Svenska Kraftnät’s accounting system (Cesar); Swedish Energy Agency 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Installed capacity of renewable electricity entitled by ECS in 2003 and 2012 
Source: Svenska Kraftnät’s accounting system (Cesar); Swedish Energy Agency 
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Figure 2.3  Renewable electricity production entitled by ECS in 2003 and 2012 
Source: Svenska Kraftnät’s accounting system (Cesar); Swedish Energy Agency 
 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 clearly show that, in Elcertifikatsystemet, number of commissioned 
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to the initial goal to stimulate electricity production from renewable sources. 
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SEA and Svenska kraftnät are the surveillance authority and the accounting registrar 
respectively, and they share the responsibility for Elcertifikatsystemet in Sweden. SEA is 
responsible for the rules and principles of the system, such as the approval of certificate 
allocation to plants, decision of late delivery penalty, monitoring and analysis of the 
development of the certificate market, etc. It is also the body who decides the quota obligation. 
Svenska kraftnät is a state-owned public enterprise, whose duties include responsibility for 
controlling Sweden’s electricity production in real time, and the import, export, and balance 
of power. In Elcertifikatsystemet, it  
• “Issues electricity certificates based on metered values from certificate-entitled   
electricity production 
• Compares and maintains the certificate register, with details of certificate holdings 
• Cancels certificates on 1st April each year, in accordance with information in the returns 
received and checked by the Swedish Energy Agency 
• Regularly publishes information on the number of certificates issued, traded and 
cancelled, together with their average price.”2  
 
Producers in Elcertifikatsystemet are defined as the certificate-entitled renewable 
electricity producers. Their production of electricity will be commissioned by green 
certificates on a one certificate per MWh basis. According to SEA, the energy sources that are 
entitled to certificates in Sweden include
3
: 
• Wind power 
• Solar energy 
• Wave energy 
• Geothermal energy 
• Biofuels, as defined in the Ordinace (2011: 1480) concerning electricity certificates 
• Hydropower 
o small-scale hydro power which, at the end of April 2003, had a 
maximum installed capacity of 1500 kW per production unit  
o new plants 
o resumed operation from plants that have been closed, if they have 
been so  extensively rebut or received such investments that the 
plants are to be regarded as new plants 
o increased production capacity from existing plants 
                                                          
2 The Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market, Annual Report 2012, the Norwegian 
Water Resource and Energy Directorate (NVE) and the Swedish Energy Agency, P14. 
3 The Electricity Certificate System 2012, Swedish Energy Agency, P7, and the website of 
Swedish Energy Agency 
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o plants that can no longer operate in an economically viable manner 
due to decisions by the authorities, or to extensive rebuilding 
• Peat, when burnt in combined heat and power (CHP) plants4 
 
In order to be equitable, it is stated that facilities built before May 2003 have to phase out 
of the system by the end of 2012 or 2014, depending on the type of subsidies they used to get 
from the government.
5
 New plants that become operational after the implementation will be 
entitled with certificates for 15 years, until the end of 2035.  
On an electricity market, electricity suppliers or electricity trading companies, are those 
who purchase electricity from the producers or on the electricity exchange, and resell it to the 
end users. Therefore, they have commercial contracts with both electricity producers and end 
users. In Elcertifikatsystemet, electricity suppliers are required to hold a certain percentage of 
certificates —quota—in relation to their sale of electricity. In fact, suppliers are not the only 
one who has quota obligations in the system. According to SEA, the quota-obligated parties 
include
6
: 
• Electricity Suppliers 
• Electricity consumers who use electricity that they themselves produced, if such 
production exceeds 60 MWh per accounting year, and has been produced in a plant with 
an installed capacity exceeding 50 KW 
• Electricity consumers to the extent that they have used electricity that they have 
imported or purchased on the Nordic power exchange 
• Electricity-intensive industries registered by SEA 
 
They are all required to comply with the annual quota set by SEA in relation to their sale 
or use of electricity. The term ‘suppliers’ used in this paper will represent all the quota-
obligated parties, if not specified. 
Electricity consumers, or electricity purchasers, or end users, are not directly connected 
to certificate trading. However, the certificate price indirectly and ultimately comes from 
consumers because it is embedded in their electricity bills. Therefore, it is the consumers who 
bear the payment for extra revenue received by renewable electricity producers. It is estimated 
by SEA that the average cost to consumers in 2011 was 4,4 öre per kWh. VAT and 
                                                          
4 Peat was introduced into the certificate system in 2004 despite the fact that it is not strictly 
classified as a renewable fuel. The reason is based on environmental considerations.  
5 See 5.1.1 for policy details. 
6 The Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market, Annual Report 2012, the Norwegian 
Water Resource and Energy Directorate (NVE) and the Swedish Energy Agency, P10. 
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transaction costs will further increase the price.
7
 However, several researches have revealed a 
much higher consumer cost and transition cost than the government estimation (Bergek and 
Jacobsson, 2010; Nilsson and Sundqvist, 2007). 
In Sweden, other than the key agents mentioned above, Cesar is a registry and 
accounting system that records the trading of certificates. It is not a marketplace for the 
trading, as it only shows the completed transactions between the two parties, e.g. who is the 
new owner of the certificate, price and quantity of the certificates traded. From 1st January 
2015, SEA has taken over the role of the accounting authority for certificates and guarantees 
of origin from Svenska kraftnät. 
Since the formation of a common certificate market between Sweden and Norway, 
corresponding agents in Norway are in place for the system as well. The Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) has the same role as SEA, and Statnett and NECS 
are respectively responsible for accounting registrar and accounting system, corresponding to 
Svenska Kraftnät and Cesar in Sweden. 
A council and a committee for the ECS are also set up in accordance with the agreement 
between Noway and Sweden. The council’s task is to facilitate planning and the 
implementation of progress reviews, among other items. The committee shall keep itself 
informed and discuss the design and implementation of the regulatory framework.
8
  
2.2.3 Mechanism of Elcertifikatsystemet 
Quota obligation is always proposed by SEA in government documents, starting from 
the publishing year until the end year of the system. The quota is different from year to year. 
When the goal of policy changes, the adjustment of quota is necessary. Figure 2.4 is a 
summary of the quota adjustments due to target changes since 2003.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The Electricity Certificate System 2012, Swedish Energy Agency, P27 
8 The Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market, Annual Report 2012, the Norwegian 
Water Resource and Energy Directorate (NVE) and the Swedish Energy Agency, P15. 
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Figure 2.4  Planned quotas for each year (2003-2015)
9
 
Source: Kontrollstation för elcertifikatsystemet 2015 (ER 2014:04) P79, Finansiering av 30 
TWh ny förnybar el till 2020 (ER 2015:07) P15 
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political interest in Elcertifikatsystemet, which is good for policy stability, although not 
sufficient. The figure also shows that, obligated quota always has the trend to increase first 
and then decline after the peak. This is to guarantee enough demand on the market before 
some plants phasing out.  
Once quota is set, the demand for certificates from the suppliers are created. On the 
supply side, renewable electricity producers have to submit their applications to SEA for the 
certificate entitlement. After the examination of the application, Svenska kraftnät issues 
electricity certificates on the 15th of each month or the next non-holiday day, based on the 
reported metrics from previous month. Producers receive one electricity certificate per MWh 
for 15 years maximum. The entitled certificates could then be sold on the market. In this way, 
producers get an extra income from selling the certificate for each MWh electricity that they 
generate, equivalent to the certificate price.  
How to ensure that the suppliers have fulfilled their quota obligation? It is done through 
the cancellation of certificates in the accounting system Cesar. By March 1st each year, 
suppliers are required to submit a declaration to SEA to specify the electricity use and 
deductions from quota obligation from the past year. They must also ensure that the 
equivalent amount of certificates in relation to their obligation is held on their account by 31st 
March. On 1st April, the obligated certificates will be cancelled thus they could not be used or 
sold again. If insufficient certificates are on the account, SEA shall decide to impose a quota 
obligation charge, which amounts to 150 percent of the volume-weighted average price under 
the accounting year for each missing certificate. 
Historically, the fulfilment of obligation has been almost 100 percent in Sweden. Table 
2.1 shows the cancellation and fulfilment rate of the quota obligation in Sweden from 2003 to 
2013. 
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Table 2.1 Cancellation of Certificates 2003-2013 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Electricity 
with quota 
obligation 
(TWh) 
63,3 97,4 97,6 97,1 96 94 90,6 98 92,5 91 93,4 
Quota 7,4% 8,1% 10,4% 12,6% 15,1% 16,3% 17% 17,9% 17,9% 17,9% 13,5% 
Number of 
cancelled 
certificates 
(million) 
3,49 7,83 10,12 12,39 14,46 15,32 15,40 17,54 16,53 16,29 12,30 
Quota 
obligation 
fulfilment (%) 
77,00 99,20 99,90 99,90 99,80 99,96 99,99 99,99 99,80 99,95 97,68 
Quota 
obligation 
fee* 
(SEK/each) 
175 240 306 278 318 431 470 402 310 298 301 
Total quota 
obligation fee 
(MSEK) 
182,8 14,4 3,1 2,3 8,3 2,3 0,7 0,8 9,5 2,6 88,1 
 
* Quota obligation fee=1.5×average certificate price (March of the year to April of the next 
year) 
Source: Cesar and own calculation for the year of 2013 
 
From the table above, it can be seen that the quota obligation has been fulfilled quite 
well during the 10 years, except the starting year 2003 and the first year after common market 
with Norway in 2013. In these two years, the quota obligation fee is much higher than the 
others, which is an extra income for the government. It is not known yet how it is used by the 
government.  
In 2012, Sweden and Norway started the operation of a common electricity certificate 
market. The goal is to increase renewable electricity production in a more cost-effective way 
instead of having two national markets. A larger group of participants and an increased 
liquidity could be expected. In fact, it is suggested that the creation of a trading market of 
certificates, in a Swedish-Norwegian context, could bring benefits such as to mitigate market 
power (Amundsen and Bergman 2012), but it also requires caution since the quota is not a 
very precise policy measure for stimulating green electricity generation (Amundsen and Nese 
2009). Furthermore, if a Nordic common certificate market exists, electricity supply based on 
biomass combustion will dominate the TGCs scheme, at least in the short run, and wind 
power may increase the share along the time (Unger and Ahlgren 2005). Some research also 
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extend this to an European-wide TGCs to see if harmonisation of the system is feasible in 
practice. They suggest that benefits from effectiveness and cost-efficiency are possible but 
should be taken care of with caution. Certain factors such as eligible technologies, market 
stabilisation mechanisms, co-existing renewable energy regulations (Nielsen and Jeppesen 
2003, Río 2005) should also be considered.  However, disadvantages of high certificate price 
due to under-supply, regulatory uncertainty (Toke 2008), as well as little chance for immature 
technologies (Río 2005) might also happen in a pan-EU trading mechanism. 
The fundamental principles for the certificate market in Norway are the same as in 
Sweden, including agencies, important dates, cancellation, and etc.. However, there are 
certain differences between the legislation. For example, peat is only entitled to electricity 
certificate in Sweden, while the proportion of biofuel in mixed waste qualifies for the 
certificates in Norway. Also, there is a possibility for a plant to get electricity certificates for 
the entire production following a major reconstruction in Sweden, while in Noway only the 
production increase will be entitled.
10
 In 2012, a total of 18.7 million electricity certificates 
were cancelled in the common market, 16.3 million in Sweden and 2.4 million in Norway. In 
2013, the cancellation decreased to 16.2 million, 12.3 million in Sweden and 3.9 million in 
Norway.  
 
 
  
                                                          
10 Other differences include: plants that become operational in Sweden after 2020 can 
receive electricity certificates, and some minor difference in exception rules for electricity-
intensive industry. 
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3. Evaluation of Renewable Energy Policies 
3.1 Four Criteria 
 In the recent report by IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency), effectiveness, 
efficiency, equity, and institutional feasibility are the four core criteria in regard to renewable 
energy deployment policy evaluations.
11
  
According to IRENA, the first two criteria have more reference in literature and are more 
easily measured through indicators. For effectiveness, there are ‘installed 
capacity’, ’electricity output and growth rates’, or ‘deployment against a country’s overall 
potential over a period of time’, and etc.; for efficiency there are ‘remuneration level’, ‘profits 
and adequacy indicators’, and ‘total costs indicator’ and many more. These two criteria 
interact closely with each other and are usually considered together to show whether a policy 
is successful or economically efficient. Our discussion in Chapter 2 on Elcertfikatsystemet’s 
number of plants, installed capacity and electricity production from renewables are relative to 
the criterion of effectiveness. Based on the results, the Swedish TGCs has met the criterion. 
Institutional feasibility is concerned with political factors that affect the policy. It is most 
appropriate for ex-ante evaluation to see if the policy environment is favourable or not.  
Compared with other criteria, equity has a wider social concern. It jumps out of the box 
to see the impacts on different parties under the policy. The success and economic efficiency 
are important performances for a public policy, nevertheless, if equity is somehow lost in 
implementation, it could not be considered adequate. Therefore, despite of the difficulty in 
identifying the indicators, equity criterion should not be neglected in policy evaluation. In this 
paper, it is the main criterion in delivering the result. 
3.2 Equity Criterion for Elcertifikatsystemet Evaluation 
Recall that in Chapter 2, we have known the characteristics of Elcertifikatsystemet, 
including key agents and how the system works. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate 
Elcertifikatsystemet using equity criterion. Equity is concerned with the distribution of policy 
impacts, but among literatures, specific indicators were only identified for consumer impacts. 
A wider range of aspects such as the distribution of costs, impacts on producers and other 
players, has equivalent importance as consumer impacts, thus the development of relative 
                                                          
11 Evaluating Renewable Energy Policy: A Review of Criteria and Indicators for Assessment, 
IRENA UKERC Policy Paper, January 2014 
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indicators should also be given attention to. In the analysis of Elcertifikatsystemet in this 
paper, the focus of equity evaluation will be the impacts on renewable electricity producers, 
financially the main beneficiaries of this policy. Since there are not as many research as those 
for effectiveness and efficiency, it is hard to identify a well-accepted measurement for equity.  
Claimed by policy makers, technology-neutral is an important feature of TGCs., which 
indicates that it is always the cheapest technology that is chosen first. However, renewable 
electricity producers are heterogeneous in term of energy sources, technology, operation time, 
scale, rate of return, etc. Will the impacts of the policy be ‘technology-neutral’ as well? Will 
some producers be over-compensated and some under-compensated due to the heterogeneity? 
These are the questions that we are going to answer in this paper. In fact, TGCs have been 
‘largely viewed as less equitable than FITs for those looking to invest in the renewable 
electricity generating industry’ (IRENA, 2014). It may create barriers for the entry of new 
renewable electricity producers and result in the increased market power for larger players 
(Batlle et al. 2012). High and persistent excessive profits are in place for mature technologies 
(Verbruggen and Lauber 2012). Bergek and Jacobsson (2010) evaluated Elcertifikatsystemet 
in response to the three policy expectations in Sweden.
12
 By analysing the data from 2003 to 
2008, they came to the conclusion that the Swedish TGCs has almost met the expectation for 
increase in renewable electricity production, but it performs badly in terms of consumer costs, 
equity, and contribution to technical change and cost reduction. Their analysis on equity in 
terms of the two types of rents in Elcertifikatsystemet sheds light on the discussion in this 
paper. We will explore further in a similar manner and measure the impacts on different 
producers, in order to see if equity issue does exist in Elcertifikatsystemet.   
                                                          
12 The three policy expectations are summarised as: to substantially increase the share of 
electricity generated from renewable energy sources, the expansion in the supply of ‘green’ 
power was to be done in a cost-efficient manner, and it would increase the competitiveness 
of electricity from renewable energy sources through technical change. 
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4. Theoretical Foundation 
4.1 Definitions of Type I and Type II Rent 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the certificate price has been introduced as an 
extra income for renewable electricity producers. In other words, a reasonable certificate price 
should be the difference between producers’ marginal cost and the electricity price on the 
market. However, if the certificate price exceeds the price gap of a certain producer, over-
compensation will occur; and if this happens to a large number of producers, equity issue rises. 
The ‘rent’, is thus generated through the over-payment for those producers, who have an 
advantage in their marginal cost.  
Figure 4.1  Type I and Type II Rent for certificate-entitled renewable electricity 
producer 
 
The cost structure of renewable electricity producers could be very different, either 
within one specific source or among different energy sources. Rent is generated in two 
situations: 1. marginal cost is below or just equivalent to the market price of electricity; 2. 
marginal cost is in between of the electricity price and the certificate-price-added electricity 
price. We assume perfect competition on the demand side, and on the supply side, that there 
are lots of ‘small’ producers, indexed by k, each with a marginal cost MCk , which may differ 
between producers. Furthermore, each producer has a fixed limit on capacity. That implies if a 
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producer ‘enters’ the market, he will produce at his full capacity with his marginal cost MCk. 
Under these assumptions, the market will look like Figure 4.1. PE and PE’ are market prices 
for electricity before and after the certificate system, MC is the marginal cost curve for 
renewable electricity producers, each point represents one small producer.  
Situation 1 applies to the producers with MC up until point A, where MC intersects PE, 
indicating that these producers are already profitable without the certificate system. They will 
get Type I rent in the yellow area, as a result of the pure price increase for the existing 
production. Situation 2 applies to the producers with MC in-between quantity A and Q on the 
curve. Their MC is higher than PE, but lower than PE’, thus the purple area is the extra 
payment above their profitable level. That is defined as Type II rent. In our analysis for Type 
II rent, all the existing plants in the system are considered to have the marginal costs 
unlimitedly approaching PE’, thus Type II rent is very small. However, it may be big if the 
certificate price is driven up by more expensive technologies in the future, which is the 
scenario we will discuss. The figure also shows that Type I and Type II rent in combination 
are actually the producer surplus from price increase.  
In our analysis for Elcertifikatsystemet, Type I rent depends on the identification of 
quantity A, or possibly a point A’ very close to A. Following Bergek and Jacobsson’s idea 
(2010), A is the certificate-entitled production in 2003, and A’ is the easily accessible 
production by plants with fairly low cost in production increase. The former (A) is the 
production that is eligible to enter Elcertifikatsystemet and receive the certificates in 2003. A 
total amount of 11,527 TWh renewable electricity (including peat) was generated in 2003, 
with 6,5 TWh certificate-entitled production (excluding peat). That includes 4,3 TWh of 
biofuel, 1,7 TWh of hydro power, and 0,5 TWh of wind power, as shown in Figure 4.2. The 
latter (A’) is the production level specifically through fuel conversion or increase in full-load 
hours in existing CHP plants, which requires much lower cost than investment in other energy 
sources or new CHP plants.
13
 The calculation of the easily accessible production will be 
discussed further in 5.1.1. Other than that, we will also analyse the Type I rent by different 
energy sources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 It could also be interpreted as Type II rent, however, in this paper, this is defined as Type I 
rent. 
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Figure 4.2  Certificate-entitled Production in 2003 
Source: Förnybar el med Gröna certifikat, Swedish Energy Agency, 2008 
 
Type II rent in this paper considers larger variation in marginal cost among producers, 
thus focusing on different technologies. More expensive technology could drive up the 
certificate price, ending up with producers of cheaper technologies receiving rents. Bergek 
and Jacobsson consider off-shore wind power driving up the certificate price to 500 SEK in 
2015. The estimated Type II rent generated until 2030 for new plants in 2003 - 2014 would be 
19 billion SEK (i.e., about 2 billion Euro) (Bergek and Jacobsson 2010). However, whether or 
not the introduction of off-shore wind power into the system is possible depends on the 
potential of renewables on the market. If the existing energy sources could provide enough 
electricity generation to meet the goal, off-shore wind will not be introduced soon. In this 
paper, regarding the uncertainty of Type II rent, we are going to estimate the supply curve of 
electricity certificate based on accessible data, and then make a rough prediction on Type II 
rent.  
4.2 Calculation of Type I Rent 
For the certificate-entitled production, recalling in Figure 4.1 quantity A, the certificate 
price is hundred percent transformed into the unit price for the rent, so the calculation should 
be: 
 
  
R1,i is the Type I rent in year i, Q0 is the certificate-entitled production, which is 6,5 TWh 
in 2003, and Pi  is the average certificate price in year i. We define the result of this 
calculation as Estimation I. 
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As previously discussed, easily accessible production (A’) is the production level that 
could be achieved at much lower cost, and it is the sum of certificate-entitle production and 
the production increase. Therefore, Type I rent for easily accessible production has two parts: 
one from certificate-entitled production with unit price as certificate price (Estimation I), the 
other from production increase with unit price as the difference between certificate price and 
marginal cost. Estimation I and the rent from production increase together, are defined as 
Estimation II (and III, see 5.1.2). If Qi  is the certified renewable electricity production in year 
i, Q1 is the accessible production (fixed value, see 5.1.1), then the production that actually 
gains additional rent in year i could be obtained by taking the minimum value between Qi and 
Q1.
14
 Assuming MCCHP is the marginal cost from production increase, therefore, the 
calculation for Type I rent in Estimation II (and III) will be: 
 
      
      
   
In addition, we are also interested the distribution of Type I rent by energy sources. The 
three estimations above roughly show the amount of over-compensation that existing 
producers have gained from Elcertifikatsystemet from 2003 to 2013. The payment includes all 
the renewable energy sources and presents a holistic picture of Type I rent. However, what 
can not be reflected is the distribution of Type I rent among all the energy sources. This is 
important because it concerns the equity issue not only among old/new plants, but also among 
old plants with regard to different energy sources. A breakdown of the Type I rent by energy 
source is necessary, and also valuable in examining the equity criterion furthermore. Energy 
sources included in the analysis will be hydropower, wind power, biofuels, peat, and solar 
energy. The calculations will be similar as that in Estimation I and II.
15
  
4.3 Calculation of Type II Rent 
4.3.1 Background 
Recalling Figure 4.1, Type II rent is considered very small at the moment. However, as 
the demand of certified electricity goes up, new technologies such as offshore wind power 
may be introduced into the certificate system, in which case, the certificate price will be 
                                                          
14 This means that we make modest estimation using the smaller value of rent-gaining 
production. 
15 Hydropower, wind power, peat, and solar energy will have one estimation based on 
certified production in 2003, but biofuels will have two estimations. See 5.1.2. 
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driven up because of the higher marginal cost. That will lead to a higher retail price of 
electricity as well, thus brings Type II rent for certified producers with lower marginal cost. 
The shape of retail supply curve is of our interest, because it could largely affect the quantity 
of Type II rent: in Figure 4.3, convex supply curve (S2*) will cause larger Type II rent than 
concave supply curve (S1*). The area with shades is the difference of Type II rent between 
S2* and S1*. 
Figure 4.3  Type II Rent and Shape of Retail Supply Curve 
 
 
In this paper, the area with shades will not be estimated numerically. However, we want 
to predict the shape of retail electricity supply curve based on relevant data and analysis, so 
that the potential scale of Type II rent could be predicted. In order to do that, we can start with 
a micro-model . 
4.3.2 Shape of Retail Electricity Supply Curve 
Assuming the total electricity supply on the retail market includes certified electricity 
from certificate-entitled renewable producers, and non-certified electricity. To derive the 
supply curve of electricity on the retail market given a TGCs system,  I follow the steps as: 
(1) Derive the supply curve for non-certified electricity; 
(2) Derive the supply curve for certified electricity; 
(3) Derive supply curve for retail electricity given that quota δ must be certified. 
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In Sweden, non-certified electricity will mainly be large scale hydro power and nuclear 
power, together with phased-out CHPs and other thermal electricity. In 2013, total electricity 
production in Sweden amounted to 149,2 TWh, of which 40,8% was produced by hydro 
power, 42,6% by nuclear power, 6,6% by wind power and the remaining 10 % by biofuel and 
fossil based production.
16
 Norway, Finland, and Denmark are the main electricity importers 
and exporters of Sweden.  
Since hydro power and nuclear power are the main producers, we can write the cost 
function (supply curve) for non-certified electricity as:  
pe is the marginal cost of non-certified production, if only non-certified electricity is 
available. δ is the quota in Elcertifikatsystemet set by the government, Q is the total demand 
for electricity. Therefore, (1-δ)Q is the demand for non-certified production. pe0 is the global 
market price of electricity, whereas pe0 and m (m>0) together show the linear relationship 
between pe and Q.  
Figure 4.4  Supply Curve of non-certified electricity in an open but restricted marke 
 
A special case of the supply curve may look like Figure 4.4. In a small country like 
Sweden, the electricity price will not have much effect on the global price, so in an worldwide 
open market, m=0 thus pe = pe0. Furthermore, under a strict regulation on the non-certified 
electricity production, e.g. new nuclear power plants or import of non-certified electricity 
                                                          
16 Own calculation based on Energiläget i siffror 2015, Swedish Energy Agency 
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from other countries is prohibited, there will be no more non-certified electricity produced 
within Sweden when (1-δ)Q exceeds the full capacity of hydro and nuclear power. Under 
these circumstances, if the demand continues to go up, production will come from certified 
producers anyways, and the certificate price will be null. Figure 4.4 is an illustration of the 
situation.  
In relation to that, how does the cost function (supply curve) of certified electricity look 
like? Since we do not know the shape, we assume the function as follows: 
In this function, δ and Q are still the quota and total demand for electricity, thus δQ is the 
demanded certificates. pe’ is the acceptable electricity price for renewables, and pe0’, 
m’(m’>0), and α (α>0) are corresponding parameters. Depending on α<1 or α>1, the supply 
curve for certified electricity could be concave or convex. When α=1, the supply curve is 
linear.  
Retail supply curve is the aggregated supply curve of non-certified and certified 
electricity. Certificate price will be the difference between pe’ and pe. 
The retail price p* could be derived through 
 
So now both the certificate price pc and retail price of electricity p* are functions of 
quota δ, electricity demand Q, world electricity price pe0 and a few parameters: pe0’, m, m’ and 
α. Based on these two functions, we can come up with two conclusions. 
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i)  As the total demand of electricity goes up, retail price of electricity will definitely go 
up. 
Fist order condition (F.O.C) is positive so p* will go up as Q increases. With a up-going 
trend, the shape of retail supply (p* and Q) depends on α.  
When 0<α<1, ∂2p*/∂Q2<0, the retail supply curve is concave. Type II rent will be small 
(S1* in Figure 4.3); when α>1, ∂
2
p*/∂Q2>0, the retail supply curve is convex, thus the Type II 
rent will be big (S2* in Figure 4.3); when α=1, all the supply curve is linear.  
 
ii)  As the total demand of electricity goes up, the certificate price may either increase or 
decrease, depending on the parameters.  
From the above F.O.C, the sign is not certain, so the direction of pc’s change is not 
certain either. However, we can assume special values for the parameter to see how pc 
changes. 
 If m=0 (as in Figure 4.4), the supply curve for non-certified electricity is horizontal,  
and ∂pc/∂Q >0, indicating certificate price will increase as demand increases. Furthermore, 
according to second-order condition, the shape of the certificate supply curve will be similar 
to the retail supply curve in i), which depends on the value of α. 
If m≠0, the influence of δ on ∂pc/∂Q
 
could be identified more easily. According to the 
value of δ (0< δ<1), when δ→0, the quota for renewable electricity is very low, ∂pc/∂Q =-
m<0, certificate price will decrease as demand increases. Although certified electricity is 
more expensive, this conclusion is possible because, as demand goes up, (1-δ)Q increases 
much faster than δQ when δ is very small, thus pe increases faster than pe’, and can be even 
higher in values. Therefore, according to the F.O.C, pc will decrease and even become 
negative. However, the certificate price will be decreasing and reach zero as the end, because 
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negative certificate price indicates that consumers are paid to buy certificates, which may not 
happen in reality. When δ→1, the use of renewable electricity becomes an ultimate obligation, 
∂pc/∂Q = αm’Q
α-1
>0, certificate price will increase as demand increases. In this situation, the 
retail supply curve is exactly the certificate supply curve. 
After the analysis above, we already have a picture on how the shape of retail electricity 
supply may affect the amount of Type II rent in the future. In Chapter 5, we are going to look 
at the data and carry out our empirical prediction.   
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5. Empirical Analysis 
Based on the understanding of policy scheme and the theoretical foundation, Chapter 5 
will present the result of historical Type I rent generated from Elecertifikatsystemet until 2013, 
and also make projections for Type II rent based on the shape of retail electricity supply curve.  
5.1 Up-to-now Rent Generation 
5.1.1 Policy Background 
Recall that facilities built before the policy was implement are planned to phase out by 
the end of 2012 or 2014, while new plants starting operation after May 2003 will be 
commissioned for 15 years. Those old plants were included in the system from the beginning 
to ensure the liquidity of the certificate market. However, in order to limit the consumer costs 
from electricity generated in these commercially viable plants, they are entitled certificates 
only until the end of 2012. For those received some public grant assistance for investment or 
conversion of the plant, they are entitled certificates until the end of 2014. However, any such 
grant must have been paid after 15th February 1998, as part of a programme of investments in 
the energy sector.
17
 
Table 5.1 shows the relevant data from different reports, which amounts to a total 
electricity production of 10,3 TWh or 11,8 TWh respectively, that is planned to phase out by 
the end of 2014.  
Table 5.1 Planned phasing-out of electricity production capacity in 2012 and 2014 
 The Swedish-Norwegian Electricity 
Certificate Market - Annual Report 
2012, SEA 
The Electricity Certificate System 
2012, SEA 
Energy Source 2012 2014 2012 2014 
Biofuel 6647 943 8122 977 
Solar 0 0 0 - 
Hydro 1896 14 1981 11 
Wind 262 545 203 481 
Total (GWh) 8805 1502 10306 1469 
Total in 2012 
and 2014 
 10307  11775 
Source: The Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market, Annual Report 2012, NVE 
and SEA; The Electricity Certificate System 2012, SEA 
                                                          
17 The Electricity Certificate System 2011, Swedish Energy Agency 
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Our analysis of Type I rent is mainly the rent for these old plants, therefore, by the end of 
2014, Type I rent will end together with the phasing-out of plants built before May 2003. The 
up-to-now rent generation in this section will be Type I rent. 
5.1.2 Data  
As previously mentioned, Cesar is the accounting system for Elcertifikatsystemet. Real 
time data of the certificate market on average price, transfer list, issuing, transfers and 
cancellation could be found on the website.
18
 It provides the data from the implementation of 
the policy in May 2003 until now, and covers the transactions in both Sweden and Norway.  
The data used for calculating Type I rent will be ‘average price’ and ‘cancellation’ of 
each accounting year. The monthly average price of certificate is shown in Figure 5.1, with a 
range between 150 SEK and 350 SEK.  
 Figure 5.1  Monthly average price of transactions in SEK 
Source: Cesar 
 
The use of ‘cancellation’ might underestimate the result because suppliers only need to 
cancel the obligated amount of certificates, if they hold more certificates than that. Since the 
extra certificates have already been paid for the producers, this part of the rent is not identified. 
This applies to Estimation I, II (and III). However, when calculating Type I rent from 
different energy sources, data on cancellation by energy source is not available in Cesar, so 
the available indicator ‘issuing’ will be used instead. That may cause overestimation because 
not every issued certificate has been definitely sold out. We should be aware of the over- and 
underestimation, but they will not affect the result too much.  
                                                          
18 https://cesar.energimyndigheten.se/WebPartPages/SummaryPage.aspx 
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We have already known that in Estimation I, the certificate-entitled production in 2003 
Q0 is 6,5 TWh, Qi is the yearly cancellation of certificates, Q1 (accessible production) and 
MCCHP (marginal cost from production increase) are still unknown. In a government 
document in 2011, short-term potential of biofuel is estimated to be 3,7-4,7 TWh in total, 
including a 2 TWh increase in biomass CHP in district heating plants and a 1,7-2,7 TWh 
increase in industrial back-pressure processes (SOU, 2001:77). This amounts to an easily 
accessible production of 10,2-11,2 TWh (including 6,5 TWh of Q0). From Table 4.1, the 
planned phasing-out production is 10,3 TWh or 11,8 TWh, which is another way of 
identifying the easily accessible production. Therefore, we choose 10,2 TWh as the minimum 
level and 11,8 TWh as the maximum level of  Q1 in this paper, and define the results of Type 
I rent as Estimation II with regard to 10,2 TWh, and Estimation III with regard to 11,8 TWh. 
MCCHP in existing CHP plants is ranged from 0 SEK/MWh (increase full-load hours) to 80 
SEK/MWh (fuel conversion) (SOU, 2001:77). We will choose the average value 40 
SEK/MWh
19
. 
When calculating Type I rent from different energy sources, similarly, there will be two 
estimations for biofuels. The first one is the certified electricity production in 2003 (4,3 TWh), 
and the second one is based on easily accessible production chosen as 8,5 TWh—4.3 TWh 
plus the mean value of short-term potential. 
So far, we have the data for all the parameters in Estimation I, II, and III.  
Pi= average monthly price 
Q0 = 6,5 TWh 
Qi = cancellation in year i 
Q1 = 10,2 TWh or 11,8 TWh 
MCCHP = 40 SEK/MWh 
5.1.3 Rent Generation (Type I Rent) 
The result of the three estimations are presented in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 40 SEK/MWh is the same value as used in Bergek and Jacobsson (2010)’s analysis. 
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Table 5.2 Type I Rent 2003-3013 
 
Source: Cesar and own calculation  
 
Column (A) and first column in (C) are yearly certificate cancellation and price, and 
column (D) shows the results of three estimations. It is based on the formulas in 4.2. A few 
points are worth noting here: a. In 2003, the cancellation amount is less than 6,5 TWh, thus 
the actual number of cancellation is used in Estimation I. b. From January 1st 2013, a total 
amount of 8,805,000 certificates were phased out, which leads to a deduction in the 
production for generating Type I rent. That explains why in 2013, column (B) is respectively 
0, 1,359 and 2,970,
20
 and in column (D) Type I rent in three estimations all decreased largely.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 The result of 6,5 - 8,805, 10,2 - 8,805, and 11,8 - 8,805. 
Year (A) 
Certific
ates  
Cancel
lation 
(Thous
and) 
(B) Production for Type I 
Rent (GWh) 
(C) 
Overcompensat
ion per 
certificate (SEK) 
(D) Type I rent (MSEK) 
≤ 6,5 
TWh 
6,5 - 10,2 
TWh 
6,5 - 
11,8 
TWh 
≤ 6.5 
TWh 
> 6.5 
TWh 
Estima
tion I 
Estimat
ion II 
Estimat
ion III 
2003 
(May-Dec) 
3 490 3 490 0 0 200,81 160,81 701 701 701 
2004 7 832 6 500 1 332 1 332 231,38 191,38 1 504 1759 1759 
2005 10 120 6 500 3 620 3 620 216,50 176,50 1 407 2046 2046 
2006 12 391 6 500 3 700 5 275 191,13 151,13 1 242 1802 2040 
2007 14 464 6 500 3 700 5 275 195,40 155,40 1 270 1845 2090 
2008 15 322 6 500 3 700 5 275 247,21 207,21 1 607 2374 2700 
2009 15 405 6 500 3 700 5 275 293,20 253,20 1 906 2843 3241 
2010 17 536 6 500 3 700 5 275 294,57 254,57 1 915 2857 3258 
2011 16 527 6 500 3 700 5 275 246,96 206,96 1 605 2371 2697 
2012 16 289 6 500 3 700 5 275 200,15 160,15 1 301 1894 2146 
2013 12 316 0 1 395 2 970 203,30 163,30 0 228 485 
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Figure 5.2  Type I Rent 2003-2013 
Source: Cesar and own calculation 
 
Three estimations of Type I rent have inverted U-shape curves. In 2006 and 2007, the 
curve had a downward trend, but recovered quickly in 2008. This happened again in 2011 
until the production finally phased out of the system in 2012. The two drops in Type I rent are 
mainly due to the price decrease in the certificate market. The prices in 2006 and 2011 hit the 
lowest level since the policy was implemented, as shown in Figure 5.1. Meanwhile, 
cancellation of certificates kept increasing from 2003, and only dropped slightly in 2011 and 
2012. The curve in Estimation I hits the x axis in 2013, representing the termination of Type I 
rent from certificate-entitled production before May 2003. In our analysis, this production is 
fixed level (6,5 TWh) so that Type I rent will be high as long as certificate price is high in 
Estimation I. This violates the intention to support new plants, because when the certificate 
price is high, more supply is needed to meet the market demand, but with such high rent for 
old producers, new plants will be very difficult to scale up. 
The value of Type I rent is between 1-2 billion SEK per year in Estimation I, and 2-3 
billion SEK per year in Estimation II and III. These are huge amount of payments from the 
consumers but gained only by commercially viable producers established before May 2003. 
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To illustrate the result furthermore, we can calculate the percentage of Type I rent in the total 
payment for certificates per year. 
 
 
Figure 5.3  Percentage of Type I Rent in total payment for certificates 
Source: Cesar and own calculation  
 
Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of Type I rent in the total payments for electricity 
certificate from 2003 to 2013. The total payment is calculated based on certificate 
cancellation and the average price of the year. In Estimation I, the rent still contributes as high 
as 40% at the last year before phasing out, and even higher in previous years. In Estimation II 
and III, the situations are worse. Type I rent contributes 58% and 66% respectively in the total 
payment in 2012, indicating that such high share in total payment has lasted so long for nine 
years, and that there is so little incentive for new plants to grow.  
If we look into different energy sources, the yearly Type I rent by energy source from 
2003 to 2013 is shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4. 
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Table 5.3 Distribution of Type I Rent (MSEK) 
Energy 
Source 
Water Wind Bio Peat Solar 
2003 194 91 847 0 0 
2004 393 116 995 126 0 
2005 368 108 931 118 0 
2006 325 96 822 104 0 
2007 332 98 840 106 0 
2008 420 124 1 063 135 0,01 
2009 498 147 1 261 160 0,012 
2010 501 147 1 267 161 0,012 
2011 420 123 1 062 135 0,010 
2012 340 100 861 109 0,008 
2013 0 48 0 0 0 
 
Source: Own calculation  
 
 
Figure 5.4  Distribution of Type I Ren 
Source: Own calculation  
 
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.4 clearly show the distribution of Type I rent by energy source.  
Only wind power is still gaining some Type I rent in 2013, while production from other 
sources have phased out. Biofuel constitutes a large share of the total Type I rent the whole 
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time before phasing out. Even at the last year in 2012, it still covers more than 60% of the rent. 
In fact, the existence of Type I rent is already not equitable for Elcertifikatsystemet, such high 
share of biofuel in the rent furthermore reveals the inequality among old plants, if using 
different energy sources. Similar to the trade-off between old and new plants as discussed in 
the last section, now it is the trade-off between old and new industries. Again, industries that 
need more incentives to grow, such as wind power and solar power, are not gaining enough 
rent in comparison with biofuels who is actually facing lower marginal cost. 
We also have made two estimations for biofuel as shown in Figure 5.5. It shows similar 
trend and conclusion from the previous estimations for Type I rent. As the main contributor 
for easily accessible production, biofuel gains almost double sized rent in the second 
estimation, indicating the huge benefit from easily accessible productions of CHP plants. 
 
 
Figure 5.5  Type I Rent for biofuels (Two Estimations) 
Source: Own calculation  
5.1.4 Discussion 
The result from up-to-now rent generation shows a very concerning picture for the 
Swedish TGCs, because the equity criterion among renewable electricity producers are 
obviously not achieved.  
• Elcertifikatsystemet is designed to encourage new production of power from renewable 
electricity producers. However, if more than half of the total payment goes to old plants 
who are already commercially viable when the system established, new plants do not 
receive enough incentives and can not expand as expected, which directly leads to less 
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investment opportunities and other shortcomings. This suggests that the phasing-out 
schedule for old plants should have been more carefully designed to lessen the 
ignorance of new plants. 
• Renewable electricity production is sensitive to many constraint factors, such as 
location, weather, timing, etc. In terms of timing, Elecertifikatsystemet has been giving 
too long certificate entitlement to old plants. High level of Type I rent is in place for so 
long, that the new plants are more and more discouraged to grow. It will also be rather 
difficult for new plants to achieve the equivalent level of production as old ones, 
because better locations, lower cost opportunities, and other advantages have already 
been taken. Therefore, Elcertifikatsystemet should consider the effects that timing issues 
may cause on newly established plants. 
• If justified, considering Type I rent as an incentive for old plants to expand their 
production, it is still not equitable among producers in different industries with different 
levels of marginal cost. The allocation of the rent shows that old biofuels (mainly 
existing CHP plants) are given unreasonable high proportion of rent, while these plants 
have limited potential in production expansion and lower marginal cost. The old plants 
of other energy sources, although rent receivers as well, could not get equivalent 
opportunities to grow. Although technology-neutral, the impacts of Elcertifikatsystemet 
has brought on plants with different renewable energy sources are not technology-
neutral. In the policy design, heterogeneity of energy sources should have been given 
more attention. 
• Existing CHP plants are the biggest beneficiary of Elcertifikatsystemet, while the new 
biofuels plants, and plants using other energy sources, either old or new, could not 
obtain the benefits they are supposed to receive. Since most of the CHP plants have 
already been phased out of the system, the rent obtained by them is sunk. However, this 
is a hint for future policy design, which should be aware of the actual beneficiary of the 
policy and make sure it matches the goal of the policy.  
 
In conclusion, the analysis of up-to-now rent shows the following facts: 
Elcertifikatsystemet is not able to stimulate new production equitably because of the existence 
of Type I rent. Type I rent’s high proportion in total payment and the long duration in the 
system discourage new plants. What’s more, equity criterion could neither be met among rent 
receivers, because a large part of the rent goes to producers with low marginal cost. 
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5.2 Future Rent Prediction 
5.2.1 Retail Electricity Supply (Estimation) 
In Chapter 4.3, we have talked about a few possible situations of the retail electricity 
supply curve, as well as the certificate supply curve. In general, if certainly identified, they 
will show the trend of retail electricity price and the certificate price as the demand of 
electricity goes up, and furthermore indicate the level of Type II rent that could be possibly 
generated in the future. However, due to the uncertainty of policy agendas for off-shore wind 
power in Sweden, we are not sure about the supply curves now. However, we can plot the 
historical data to see the trend so far, and make relevant predictions on that. The future rent 
prediction here is Type II rent.  
Based on the data from 2003 to 2014, the retail electricity price p*, certificate price pc 
and quantity Q of each year are plotted in the axis. The trend line is also generated given 
different values of α, thus shown as linear, concave, and convex in Figure 5.6. It is worth 
mentioning that the horizontal axis is δQ, recalling the equations for p* and pc in 4.3.2. 
 
Figure 5.6  Plotted supply curve of retail electricity and electricity certificate 
Source: see Appendix II. 
 
In Figure 5.6, retail electricity supply curve is shown above and certificate supply curve 
is below. The plotted graph confirms our discussion on F.O.C in 4.3.2, that i) As the total 
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demand of electricity goes up, retail price of electricity will definitely go up, as well as the 
conclusion from m=0 in ii) As the total demand of electricity goes up, the certificate price 
will increase. As for the shape of the supply curves, the graph shows how the linear, concave, 
and convex supply curve may look like under the case of  α=1, 0<α<1, and α>1. The next step 
of the prediction is to speculate values of other parameters (m, m’), and the exact value of α. 
As seen in each small graph, the equation is easily obtained, which could be used as reference 
for the speculation. The rest of the predication is worthy of further research, which, however, 
will not be discussed here. 
5.2.2 Policy 
According to a report by Swedish Environmental Institute and WWF Sweden in 2011,  
Wind power will increase to 20 TWh in 2020, 30 TWh in 2030, and reach 45 TWh in 2050. 
According to the long-term forecast of the Swedish Energy Agency, electricity generation in 
Sweden is expected to total 175 TWh with electricity exports of 24 TWh in 2020 and 23 TWh 
in 2030. However, there is no clear policy inclination that has been shown to introduce off-
shore wind power in Sweden. In a recent meeting for Elcertifikatsystemet, it has been pointed 
out that greater transparency of the policy is required, “the Swedish Energy Agency should be 
tasked to provide information on the planned expansion of facilities in the electricity 
certificate system…”.  It is said that relevant information will be published in quarterly report 
in May 2015.  
5.2.3 Rent Generation 
Recalling that the goal set in 2012 was to increase renewable electricity production by 
13.2 TWh between 2012 and 2020. Based on that, we can actually make a rough estimation 
on the certificate price. In 2012, the renewable electricity production �Q was 16,29 TWh, so 
an additional 13,2 TWh will lead to 29,49 TWh in 2020. In the three situations, the speculated 
certificate price will be 301,51 SEK, 260,26 SEK, and 580,23 SEK, which is consistent with 
our analysis that a convex supply curve indicates higher Type II rent, and a concave supply 
curve indicates smaller Type II rent. When the supply curve is linear, the rent is in between of 
the two situations. With the data of certificate price, it is not difficult to calculate Type II rent, 
given other parameters. We will not discuss further here.  
5.2.4 Discussion  
The volume of Type II rent will be largely dependent on the shape of retail electricity 
supply and certificate supply. These two supply curves are not certainly identified at the 
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moment, however, predictions could be made by speculating the values of a few parameters. 
It is confirmed that concave supply curve indicates a much lower Type II rent generation than 
convex or linear supply curves, and when the policy intention is clearer and more certain, it 
will not be difficult to identify the potential volume of Type II rent, thus evaluate the equity 
performance of Elcertifikatsystemet in the future. 
In all three situations, the existence of Type II rent and conclusions from the analysis of 
Type I rent, could shed some light on the policy design or adjustment of Elcertifikatsystemet 
in the future. The heterogeneity of renewable electricity producers should be given enough 
attention to, which directly leads to the equity issue between old and new plants, as well as 
among different renewable energy sources. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper is an exploration of the rent generation issue in the Swedish TGCs system 
Elcertifikatsystemet, and aims to evaluate the system from the equity perspective. We start 
from knowing the policy, agents involved and how exactly it works. We also went over the 
criteria usually used for renewable energy policy evaluations. After that, we start our 
evaluation for Elcertifikatsystemet. 
Following Bergek and Jacobsson’s analysis in 2010, the excessive payment for 
renewable electricity producers are categorised into two types, Type I rent from the 
overcompensation for existing plants before the implementation of the system in 2003, and 
Type II rent from higher certificate price driven by the introduction of more expensive 
technologies into the system. According to the policy formulation, the first type of rent will 
end by the end of 2014, because all those plants will be phased out of the system by then; and 
as for the second type, the estimation is not in exact numbers but the trend in the future.  
Based on the analysis for Type I rent, Elcertifikatsystemet failed to meet its goal to 
encourage new production of power from renewable electricity producers. The reasons are a 
few: more than half of the total payment goes to old plants who are already commercially 
viable when the system established, while new plants do not receive enough investment 
opportunities; unreasonably high Type I rent exists for almost ten years, which largely affects 
the timing of renewable energy projects to take better locations, lower cost opportunities, or 
other advantages; existing CHP plants with limited potential to grow are the biggest 
beneficiary of Elcertifikatsystemet, while the new biofuels plants, and plants using other 
energy sources, either old or new, could not obtain the benefits they are supposed to receive. 
Although Type I rent finally ends by 2014, the effect it has placed on the renewable electricity 
producers could not be easily ignored. The rent has shaped the current structure of renewable 
electricity supply, which is not easily adjustable. It has also influenced the expectations on the 
market, where new renewable energy power plants are more cautious in entering. In a word, 
the huge amount of Type I rent and long duration in place have caused negative impacts on 
renewable electricity producers, and the impacts are not technology-neutral.  
As for Type II rent, it is not easy to predict the volume of rent generation without a 
certain picture of whether more expensive renewable electricity production might be included 
into the system. However, if the shape of retail supply curve could be identified through 
further research on the unknown parameters, the volume of Type II rent could be anticipated 
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in numerical terms, thus we can also make conclusions on whether equity criterion has been 
met.  
The analysis of Type I rent and Type II rent also reveals the fact that enough 
consideration should be taken on the heterogeneity of renewable electricity producers, 
including old and new plants, as well as plants based on different renewable sources. The 
reason is the equity issue discussed in this paper. In practice, it could be shortening the time 
for old plants to be in the system, making entitlement of certificates based on operational level, 
or different certificate prices for different energy sources, and etc. This was not covered in 
this paper, but the conclusions we get from the research could shed light on the future policy 
design or adjustment of Elcertifikatsystemet. 
Although the research made in this paper endeavours to be detail-oriented, it can not be 
thorough and there are limitations. The categorisation of Type I and Type II rent, above all, is 
not the only way to carry out research on equity issues. During the analysis, some values 
chosen are not accurate enough due to lack of data, such as the average marginal cost in 
existing CHP plants, easily accessible production, etc. This paper did not take a closer look at 
the consumers, who are important agent in the system as well. More information on the 
consumer cost will help interpreting our results furthermore. There are indeed a lot to improve 
in further research. Other than overcoming the shortages listed above, the shape of supply 
curves is worthy of exploration. With the conclusion from both Type I and Type II rent 
analysis, a more complete picture could be presented in terms of the equity performance of 
Swedish TGCs — Elcertifikatsystemet. 
 
  
 40 
References 
Abolhosseini, S., and A. Heshmati. "The Main Support Mechanisms to Finance Renewable 
Energy Development." Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews 40 (2014): 876-85.  
Amundsen, E. S., F. M. Baldursson, and J. B. Mortensen. "Price Volatility and Banking in 
Green Certificate Markets." Environmental & Resource Economics 35.4 (2006): 259-
87.  
Amundsen, E. S., and L. Bergman. "Green Certificates and Market Power on the Nordic 
Power Market." Energy Journal 33.2 (2012): 101-17. 
Amundsen, E. S., and J. B. Mortensen. "The Danish Green Certificate System: Some Simple 
Analytical Results." Energy Economics 23.5 (2001): 489-509.  
Amundsen, E. S., and G. Nese. "Integration of Tradable Green Certificate Markets: What Can 
Be Expected?" Journal of Policy Modeling 31.6 (2009): 903-22.  
Aune, F. R., H. M. Dalen, and C. Hagem. "Implementing the Eu Renewable Target through 
Green Certificate Markets." Energy Economics 34.4 (2012): 992-1000.  
Batlle, C., I. J. Perez-Arriaga, and P. Zambrano-Barragan. "Regulatory Design for Res-E 
Support Mechanisms: Learning Curves, Market Structure, and Burden-Sharing." 
Energy Policy 41 (2012): 212-20.  
Bergek, A., and S. Jacobsson. "Are Tradable Green Certificates a Cost-Efficient Policy 
Driving Technical Change or a Rent-Generating Machine? Lessons from Sweden 
2003-2008." Energy Policy 38.3 (2010): 1255-71.  
Bohringer, C., and K. E. Rosendahl. "Green Promotes the Dirtiest: On the Interaction between 
Black and Green Quotas in Energy Markets." Journal of Regulatory Economics 37.3 
(2010): 316-25.  
Contaldi, M., et al. "Evaluation of Green-Certificates Policies Using the MARKAL-MACRO-
Italy Model." Energy Policy 35 (2007): 797–808.  
Currier, K. M. "A Regulatory Adjustment Process for the Determination of the Optimal 
Percentage Requirement in an Electricity Market with Tradable Green Certificates." 
Energy Policy 62 (2013): 1053-57.  
Darmani, A., et al. "What Drives the Development of Renewable Energy Technologies? 
Toward a Typology for the Systemic Drivers." Renewable & Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 38 (2014): 834-47.  
del Rio, P., and E. Cerda. "The Policy Implications of the Different Interpretations of the 
Cost-Effectiveness of Renewable Electricity Support." Energy Policy 64 (2014): 364-
72.  
del Rio, P.  "A European-wide harmonised tradable green certificate scheme for renewable 
electricity: is it really so beneficial? “ Energy Policy 33 (2005): 1239–1250  
Ek, K. "Public and Private Attitudes Towards "Green" Electricity: The Case of Swedish Wind 
Power." Energy Policy 33.13 (2005): 1677-89.  
Ericsson, K., et al. "Bioenergy Policy and Market Development in Finland and Sweden." 
Energy Policy 32.15 (2004): 1707-21.  
Fagiani, R., and R. Hakvoort. "The Role of Regulatory Uncertainty in Certificate Markets: A 
Case Study of the Swedish/Norwegian Market." Energy Policy 65 (2014): 608-18.  
Fleten, S. E., G. Ringen, and Ieee. "New Renewable Electricity Capacity under Uncertainty: 
The Potential in Norway." 2006 International Conference on Probabilistic Methods 
Applied to Power Systems, Vols 1 and 2  (2006): 254-61.  
Fleten, S. E., G. Ringen, and Ieee. "New Renewable Electricity Capacity under Uncertainty: 
The Potential in Norway." 2006 International Conference on Probabilistic Methods 
Applied to Power Systems, Vols 1 and 2  (2006): 254-61.  
 41 
Fristrup, P. "Some Challenges Related to Introducing Tradable Green Certificates." Energy 
Policy 31.1 (2003): 15-19.  
Haas, R., et al. "Efficiency and effectiveness of promotion systems for electricity generation 
from renewable energy sources e Lessons from EU countries." Energy 36 (2011): 
2186-2193. 
Jacobsson, S., et al. "Eu Renewable Energy Support Policy: Faith or Facts?" Energy Policy 
37.6 (2009): 2143-46.  
Jaraite, J., and A. Kazukauskas. "The Profitability of Electricity Generating Firms and 
Policies Promoting Renewable Energy." Energy Economics 40 (2013): 858-65.  
Jensen, S. G., and K. Skytte. "Interactions between the Power and Green Certificate Markets." 
Energy Policy 30.5 (2002): 425-35.  
Kildegaard, A. "Green Certificate Markets, the Risk of over-Investment, and the Role of 
Long-Term Contracts." Energy Policy 36.9 (2008): 3413-21.  
Mitchell, C., and T. Anderson. "The Implications of Tradable Green Certificates for the Uk." 
International Journal of Ambient Energy 21.3 (2000): 161-68.  
Morthorst, P. E. "A Green Certificate Market Combined with a Liberalised Power Market." 
Energy Policy 31.13 (2003): 1393-402.  
Morthorst, P. E. "The Development of a Green Certificate Market." Energy Policy 28 
(2000):1085-1094. 
Nielsen, L., and T. Jeppesen. "Tradable Green Certificates in Selected European Countries - 
Overview and Assessment." Energy Policy 31.1 (2003): 3-14.  
Nilsson, M., and T. Sundqvist. "Using the Market at a Cost: How the Introduction of Green 
Certificates in Sweden Led to Market Inefficiencies." Utilities Policy 15.1 (2007): 49-
59.  
Nishio, K., and H. Asano. "Supply Amount and Marginal Price of Renewable Electricity 
under the Renewables Portfolio Standard in Japan." Energy Policy 34.15 (2006): 
2373-87.  
Oikonomou, V., and L. Mundaca. "Tradable White Certificate Schemes: What Can We Learn 
from Tradable Green Certificate Schemes?" Energy Efficiency 1.3 (2008): 211-32.  
Pettersson, F., and P. Soderholm. "The Diffusion of Renewable Electricity in the Presence of 
Climate Policy and Technology Learning: The Case of Sweden." Renewable & 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 13.8 (2009): 2031-40.  
Ragwitz, M., and S. Steinhilber. "Effectiveness and Efficiency of Support Schemes for 
Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Energy 
and Environment 3.2 (2014): 213-29.  
Schaffer, L. M., and T. Bernauer. "Explaining Government Choices for Promoting Renewable 
Energy." Energy Policy 68 (2014): 15-27.  
Soderholm, P. "The political economy of international green certificate markets.” Energy 
Policy 36 (2008): 2051– 2062.  
Soderholm, P., K. Ek, and M. Pettersson. "Wind Power Development in Sweden: Global 
Policies and Local Obstacles." Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews 11.3 (2007): 
365-400.  
Tamas, M. M., S. O. B. Shrestha, and H. Z. Zhou. "Feed-in Tariff and Tradable Green 
Certificate in Oligopoly." Energy Policy 38.8 (2010): 4040-47.  
Toke, D. "The Eu Renewables Directive - What Is the Fuss About Trading?" Energy Policy 
36.8 (2008): 3001-08.  
Unger, T., and E. O. Ahgren. "Impacts of a Common Green Certificate Market on Electricity 
and Co2-Emission Markets in the Nordic Countries." Energy Policy 33.16 (2005): 
2152-63.  
 42 
Verbruggen, A. "Performance Evaluation of Renewable Energy Support Policies, Applied on 
Flanders' Tradable Certificates System." Energy Policy 37.4 (2009): 1385-94.  
Verbruggen, A. "Tradable Green Certificates in Flanders (Belgium)." Energy Policy 32.2 
(2004): 165-76.  
Verbruggen, A. "Windfalls and Other Profits." Energy Policy 36.9 (2008): 3249-51.  
Verbruggen, A., and V. Lauber. "Assessing the Performance of Renewable Electricity 
Support Instruments." Energy Policy 45 (2012): 635-44.  
Verbruggen, A., and V. Lauber. "Basic Concepts for Designing Renewable Electricity 
Support Aiming at a Full-scale Transition by 2050." Energy Policy 37 (2009): 5732–
5743. 
Wahlund, B., J. Y. Yan, and M. Westermark. "Increasing Biomass Utilisation in Energy 
Systems: A Comparative Study of Co2 Reduction and Cost for Different Bioenergy 
Processing Options." Biomass & Bioenergy 26.6 (2004): 531-44.  
Wetterlund, E., and M. Soderstrom. "Biomass Gasification in District Heating Systems - the 
Effect of Economic Energy Policies." Applied Energy 87.9 (2010): 2914-22.  
The Profitability of Power Generating Firms and Policies Promoting Renewable Energy. 9th 
International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM). May 10-12 2012. 
Ieee, 2012. 
Impact Assessment. Commission Staff Working Paper. Commission of European Union. 
Brussels, 23 January 2008 SEC(2008) 85/3. 
Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2012: An Overview. The International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA), 2013. 
Evaluating Renewable Energy Policy: A Review of Criteria and Indicators for Assessment. 
The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), January 2014. 
The Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market. Annual Report 2012. Swedish Energy 
Agency and Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, 2013. 
The Electricity Certificate System 2012. Swedish Energy Agency. 
The Electricity Certificate System 2011. Swedish Energy Agency. 
Kontrollstation för elcertifikatsystemet 2015. ER 2014:04. Swedish Energy Agency. 2014. 
Förnybar el med gröna certifikat. Prop. 2005/06:154.  
Höjt mål och vidareutveckling av elcertifikatsystemet. Prop. 2009/10:133.  
Elcertifikatsystemet 2009. Swedish Energy Agency. 
Elcertifikatsystemet 2008. Swedish Energy Agency. 
  
 43 
 
A：Appendix I: Quota Adjustment 
Table A.1 Quota Adjustment of policy changes from 2003 to 2015 
 
 
  
Year of policy 
changes 
2003 2006 2010 2014 2015 
2003 0,074     
2004 0,081     
2005 0,104     
2006 0,126     
2007 0,141 0,151    
2008 0,153 0,163    
2009 0,16 0,17    
2010 0,169 0,179 0,179    
2011  0,156 0,179    
2012  0,161 0,179    
2013  0,089 0,135    
2014  0,094 0,142    
2015  0,097 0,143    
2016  0,111 0,144  0,230  0,231  
2017  0,111 0,152  0,246  0,247  
2018  0,111 0,168  0,262  0,270  
2019  0,112 0,181  0,276  0,291  
2020  0,112 0,195  0,266  0,288  
2021  0,113 0,190  0,250  0,272  
2022  0,106 0,180  0,235  0,257  
2023  0,094 0,170  0,222  0,244  
2024  0,09 0,161  0,205  0,227  
2025  0,083 0,149  0,184  0,206  
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Table A.1 Quota Adjustment of policy changes from 2003 to 2015 (Continued) 
  
Year 2003 2006 2010 2014 2015 
2026  0,075 0,137  0,161  0,183  
2027  0,067 0,124  0,140  0,162  
2028  0,059 0,107  0,124  0,146  
2029  0,05 0,092  0,108  0,130  
2030  0,042 0,076  0,091  0,114  
2031   0,061  0,071  0,094  
2032   0,045  0,053  0,076  
2033   0,028  0,037  0,052  
2034   0,012  0,021  0,028  
2035   0,008  0,013  0,013  
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B：Appendix II: Data for Plotting 
Table B.1 Data for plotting supply curves (2003 to 2013) 
 
Year Certificate 
Price 
(SEK) 
Nord Pool 
price in 
Sweden 
(SEK/MWh
) 
Nord Pool 
system 
price 
(SEK/MW
h) 
Quota Total 
demand 
for 
electricity 
(TWh) 
�Q 
2003 200,81 333,00 334,90 7,4% 63,3 4,6842 
2004 231,38 256,30 263,90 8,1% 97,4 7,8894 
2005 216,5 276,40 272,50 10,4% 97,6 10,1504 
2006 191,13 445,40 449,80 12,6% 97,1 12,2346 
2007 195,4 280,20 258,70 15,1% 96 14,496 
2008 247,21 491,60 431,20 16,3% 94 15,322 
2009 293,20 392,80 372,20 17% 90,6 15,402 
2010 294,57 542,50 505,90 17,9% 98 17,542 
2011 246,96 430,80 423,50 17,9% 92,5 16,5575 
2012 200,15 281,90 272,20 17,9% 91 16,289 
2013 203,3 340,80 329,00 13,5% 93,4 12,609 
 
 
